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Locally motivated air quality programs in Santiago and Mexico City have only minor collateral
benefits for the global climate. If agencies with global and local  agendas did business together,
then individuals and firms and even cities would act globally when thinking locally, and one
would see greater synergy. Eskeland and Xie find that locally motivated air quality programs
for urban transport have limited collateral benefits in terms of protecting the global climate.
This could puzzle some, since these two public goods  one global, one local  seem to be
jointly produced. However, air quality in Mexico City, Santiago, and elsewhere is
predominantly pursued by technical improvements (making cars and fuels cleaner), and not
by reducing demand for polluting goods and services (though in Europe high fuel taxes help
reduce demand). Control programs developed under joint stimulus to protect the global and
local environment have not yet been seen, and they may surprise us when they come. However,
they will likely rely more on reducing demand, using instruments such as corrective (Pigovian)
taxes on fuels. The authors show how, if locally and globally charged agencies can do business
together, consumers, producers, and cities will act globally when thinking locally. Only then
will we know the extent to which local and global benefits are produced jointly.
I. Introduction: A Local Public Good and a Global Public Good
Local air pollution tends to be awarded priority over global climate change
concerns, due to the adverse effects on health resulting from local pollutant
emissions. Such health damages have long been recognized in theJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
1 In “The Economics of Welfare” (1920), A.C. Pigou used activities emitting “smoke” to
illustrate that social returns can differ from private returns, and cited studies giving
quantitative estimates for damages from Manchester and Pittsburgh.  The term “Pigovian
taxes,” reflects his demonstration of a coordinating role for government, and taxes on
emissions as the recommended policy instrument.
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industrialized world, and polluted cities in industrialized countries—such
as in the Ruhr area of Germany, in London, and in Pittsburgh—have long
ago moved to control dust emissions.1 Even now, as particle and lead
concentrations have been reduced in many cities, and the main priority is
reduction in ground-level ozone, expected improvements in public health
are the main driving force. In many developing country cities, air quality is
an emerging priority, and the main motivator is again health effects (see, for
instance, World Bank 1992; Ostro 1992; Ostro et al. 1996, 1998; Working
Group 1997, and Cropper et al. 1997). As examples, in Jakarta, Indonesia,
an estimated 1500 premature deaths are caused annually by air pollution
(Ostro 1992). A recent World Bank report (World Bank 1997) estimates that
each year 178,000 Chinese suffer premature deaths because of urban air
pollution. Health effects of air pollution are demonstrated in cities as diverse
as Beijing, Krakow, New Delhi, Sao Paulo, and Santiago, and are expected
to be important in hundreds of cities in developing as well as industrialized
countries. In a study of Santiago, Chile, an air pollution control strategy was
found to be fully justified merely by modestly estimated improvements in
public health (Eskeland, 1997).
There is also increasing evidence that human activities (including the
use of fossil fuels) cause global climate change, with a range of adverse
impacts on economy and environment in many countries (see, for instance,
IPPC 1996; Cline 1992). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) concluded that “the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human
influence on global climate.”(Houghton et al. 1996). The IPCC also estimates
that unabated emissions of greenhouse gases will lead to a rise of 1 to 3.5
degrees Centigrade in global temperature and a 15 to 95 cm rise in sea levelACTING GLOBALLY WHILE THINKING LOCALLY 387
by 2100. This could result in the inundation of low-lying areas, changes in
cropping patterns, increased drought and flooding in some areas, and loss of
biodiversity, among other effects. Changes in the frequency and intensity of
tropical monsoons could increase flood deaths and other damages.
This study uses the term public goods for air quality and the global climate,
not because the control should be by the government—the government is
anyway just a conduit for private resources. Rather, the term public goods is
used because enjoyment of air quality and climate is non-exclusive—such
goods can be enjoyed by one individual without excluding the enjoyment by
another.  The contrast to public goods are private goods—sometimes called
rivalrous—such as bread, for which each slice is had by one person or another.
Air quality is called a local public good because its benefit domain is confined
to a city, or an airshed (e.g., a valley), while the climate is thought of as a
global public good for obvious reasons (the world we share is spherical). A
long-standing theme in public finance, originating with Pigou (1920), is that
public goods such as air quality and public safety create a need for
coordination beyond what would be delivered by voluntary trades and the
market mechanism. Emission taxes and regulation are amongst coordination
mechanisms discussed in the literature.
The question we ask in the following study is to what extent there is
synergy in the solutions to urban air pollution problems and global warming
problems.  In other words, we ask whether two public goods, one with a
local domain, and one with a global domain, are jointly produced, in the
same way as are mutton and wool. A number of studies have addressed this
problem in different ways. For example, Burtraw and Toman (1997) review
studies that assess environmental ancillary effects of greenhouse gas
mitigation policies. Our approach is somewhat different, since we look at
how two differently directed policy agendas would interact through their
strategies and whether local and global benefits can be achieved
simultaneously.
In our paper, we study some aspects of integration between local air
pollution problems—the way they are experienced in metropolitan areas suchJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 388
as Santiago, Chile and Mexico City—and the problem of global climate
change. The integration involves aspects of environmental science and
engineering, of economics and of institutional mechanism design. The two
problems have in common that they are caused in part by emissions from
human activities, and in particular by byproducts of combustion of fossil
fuels. On this basis alone, one could say that there is a strong synergy in the
sense that a complete shutdown of combustion activities would likely solve
much of urban air pollution problems as well as saving the global climate. In
our study, however, we examine more realistic (and indeed more attractive)
strategies, such as modest reductions in fuel combustion, and carefully
designed urban air quality control programs. Along these lines of collective
action, we will show that the “jointness” in production of the two public
goods is not as obvious—not as firm—as one might expect.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In part II, we review locally
motivated vehicular emission control programs for Mexico City and Santiago,
and explain how the goals pursued differ from those relating to the global
climate change agenda; in part III, we examine quantitatively the synergy
between the two objectives, and check how local programs would be modified
if credited with ‘collateral’ global benefits; in part IV, we show how fuel
taxes can be used alone or together with other instruments to pursue both
goals; and in part V we envision a scenario wherein agencies with local and
global agendas do business together.
II. The Background Studies: Two Locally Motivated Emission
Control Programs
While emissions from the same polluting sources contribute to both local
and global problems, the type of emissions that contribute to each are very
different. Thus, an urban air quality agency and a climate protection agency
dislike different byproducts of combustion, in the same way as wool
merchants and butchers appreciate grazing sheep for different reasons.ACTING GLOBALLY WHILE THINKING LOCALLY 389
In this study, we use measures of six local air pollutants and three
greenhouse gases (GHGs). We have explained in Annex 1 our central
assumptions and sources regarding emission coefficients and how they are
given priority weights according to a local and a global agenda, respectively.
A few reports (see Eskeland 1994 and World Bank 1994) explain the basis
for weights representing local priorities. These should not be considered
“final answer”, but estimates based on present knowledge and plausible
assumptions. Central to our argument here is that emission components
weighted locally are not weighted globally and vice versa.  This proposition
is not likely in serious dispute.
Major local air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles are nitrogen oxides
(NOx), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur
oxides (SOx), particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10),
and lead. Their relative weighting is also associated with uncertainty and
professional debate. Among these the problems and priorities will—and
should—differ from one city to another: Early phases of urban air pollution
control will typically emphasize dust and small particles (the now mostly
historical London smog, which alerted the profession to air pollution’s effect
on premature mortality) and lead, but this emphasis fades as those pollutants
are removed. Present programs in the US and Western Europe emphasize
the precursors of ozone: volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides,
and this emphasis also inadvertently raises the emphasis of gasoline vehicles
in a control program. Effects on human health will usually be key amongst
the concerns in urban air pollution control programs.  Such  programs will
not pay any attention to carbon dioxide (CO2), and typically not to methane
and nitrous oxides either—the three most important pollutants in terms of
global climate change.
In an attempt to answer how urban air pollution control programs could
be modified by taking into consideration global climate change concerns,
we revisit locally motivated pollution control programs for transport in
Mexico City and Santiago, Chile (see World Bank 1992, 1996; Eskeland
1992, 1994, 1997). The analytical bases in the two programs differJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 390
considerably, and we shall therefore use the studies differently. The Mexico
City analysis evaluates in detail a wide range of technical measures in which
vehicles and fuels can be made less polluting. 26 control measures remained—
to be represented on the curve—after others were excluded because they did
not belong on a cost-effective expansion path (Figure 1). The measures can
be grouped as follows: vehicle retrofitting, emission standards and inspection
programs, fuel improvements and alternative fuels. The study used a cost-
effectiveness measure developed by giving different pollutants different
weights, but did not produce estimates of the benefits of urban pollution
reductions. The weights were dominated by accepted health considerations,
giving lead a high weight, CO a low weight, and with PM10, SOx, and NOx
intermediate weights (per emitted ton). The program ranked the 26 options
according to cost effectiveness, to show how emission reductions could be
provided at a lowest possible cost (Figure 1, adopted from Eskeland, 1994).
However, since benefits were not estimated, the study did not indicate a
desirable level of emission reductions.
The Santiago study, in contrast, only analyzed three broadly defined
emission control strategies (emission standards for buses, cars and trucks),
and thus does not have the same amount of detail in terms of technical control
alternatives. Rather, analytical resources were geared towards obtaining
estimates for the benefits of pollution reductions, employing models of health
effects, pollutant exposure and dispersion. The Santiago study broke new
ground in terms of completing a multi-pollutant cost-benefit analysis of
emission controls—including costing control alternatives, dispersion and
exposure modeling, dose response estimation for health effects, and valuation
of these health effects (see World Bank 1994; Eskeland 1997). Ostro (1992)
had laid the groundwork for using transferred dose response functions for
health effects. In the Santiago study, a subset of the dose-response functions
were estimated locally, lending empirical support to the working assumptions
that dose response functions can be applied for transfers from other cities
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Figure 1. Program to Reduce Local Air Pollution
Emissions in Mexico City, with and without a fuel tax
Table 1 shows health benefits, in dollars per ton of emitted pollutants,
resulting from modestly estimated and modestly valued effects on human
health in Santiago. To facilitate a practitioner's understanding, we have also
included what this would imply in terms of dollars per liters of gasoline in
the city, with alternative figures when we assume controlled and uncontrolled
vehicles. However, uncertainty and discussion prevail in terms of what should
be the priorities between emitted pollutants in locally motivated air pollution
control programs. The approach using transferred dose-response functionsJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 392
for health effects has led to a high relative value on small dust particles
(PM10), due to their well-documented effects on a range of morbidity
symptoms as well as on premature mortality. Present professional debate
gives many reasons to believe that the relative weighting of PM10 could be
even higher than what is reflected in Table 1, due to downward biases both
in terms of quantity and value of mortality effects. The Santiago study—in
contrast to the Mexico City study, excluded effects of lead and carbon
monoxide. Lead was excluded because lead in gasoline was insignificant,
since it was already in the process of being phased out. Carbon monoxide
was excluded because there are as yet no quantified dose-response functions
in the literature. Neither of these omissions have any importance in a study
of the interaction with global objectives: Lead can be ignored because lead
reduction strategies operate independently of GHG emissions, carbon
monoxide because carbon is valued equivalently in a GHG program whether
it appears as CO or as CO2.
Table 1. Health Benefits of Emission Controls, Santiago, Chile
US$ Illustration: Implied Cost:
per emitted ton US cents per liter gasoline
Controlled Uncontrolled
vehicles  vehicles
Small particles (PM10) $18,200 0.2 0.9
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) $1,400 0.9 1.8
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) $500 0.2 1.3
   Total 1.3 4.0
 Note: Four cents per liter is roughly 20 to 25 percent ad valorem, assuming a world price of
gasoline of 0.8 to $1 per gallon. Source: World Bank, 1994; authors' calculations.
Prioritization of emitted pollutants as greenhouse gases (GHG) is
according to their global warming potential (GWP), which puts a heavy
weight on gases that play little or no role in urban air pollution controlACTING GLOBALLY WHILE THINKING LOCALLY
2 Since the global climate has not yet been given any scientifically based (or consensus)
value, other values could also be contemplated (our essential points are unchanged). $20 per
ton is indicated by Fankhauser (1995).
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programs. Table 2 shows the relative weights for greenhouse gases used in
this study, with the level illustrated by using a global benefit of US$20 per
ton of carbon equivalents (i.e., $5.4 per ton of CO2).2
Table 2. Global Benefits by Emitted Pollutant
(according to global warming potential, GHG)
US$ Illustration: Implied Costs:
per emitted ton US cents per liter gasoline
controlled uncontrolled
 vehicles  vehicles
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) $5.4 1.3 1.3
Methane (CH4) $134 0.0 0.01
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) $1,744 0.25 0.02
   Total 1.5 1.3
 Note: The global benefit of  $20 per ton of carbon ($5.4/ton CO2) is from Fankhauser
(1995). The benefits of CH4 and N2O are derived by using their global warming potential
factors recommended by IPCC (1995). VOC and CO are not valued directly, only in terms
of their ‘terminal’ status as CO2.
Comparing Tables 1 and 2, it can be seen that the pollutants (gases and
small dust particles) that are valued in a locally motivated program (Table 1)
are not valued in terms of GWP (Table 2), and vice versa. The hydrocarbons
that are targeted for emission control in an air pollution control program,
volatile organic compounds (or non-methane hydrocarbons) are targeted
precisely because of their reactivity. In terms of GWP, in contrast, the only
hydrocarbon that is given a value different from its terminal role as CO2 is
methane, which has a high discounted global warming potential because it
lives long in the atmosphere in a form with much higher spontaneous globalJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
3 In fact, as the example showed in Table 2, the light-duty gasoline vehicle control option
emits more GHGs per liter of gasoline in part because of higher N2O emission per liter
resulted from higher temperature and more complete combustion.
4 The study (Eskeland, 1994) included arguments for and estimates of a ‘matching gasoline
tax’, optimally to be combined with other instruments (figure 1). In Mexico at the time,
gasoline prices were increased (and other taxes reduced to compensate), but whether pollu-
tion control was the dominant motivator is subject to interpretation.
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warming potential than CO2. When emissions of VOC and carbon monoxide
(CO) are reduced in a locally motivated air pollution control program, the
result is merely to increase the share of carbon atoms that are emitted directly
as CO2 (more complete combustion). Such technical controls, therefore, have
no significant effect on global warming. When a technical option contributes
to GHG emissions reduction, it is typically because the option makes vehicles
more fuel efficient. Thus, there are less pollution emissions per mile or
kilometers driven, but typically not per liter of fuel consumed.3
III. Locally Motivated Programs and their “Collateral” Global
Benefits?
The local programs in Mexico City and Santiago are quite effective in
reducing air pollution locally—the Mexico City program can reduce 64
percent of the locally weighted air pollutant emissions from motor vehicles
(see Figure 1). What is the effect of local programs on GHG emission
reductions? The 26 measures identified in the Mexico City study are
technically oriented, and none of them deal with demand management or
alternative transportation modes.4 In part, this is why this program has a
very limited effect on the global environment. Figure 2 reveals that the Mexico
program would reduce only 6.5 percent of GHG emissions despite the success
in local pollution reduction. In fact, the 6.5 percent may well be an upwardly
biased estimate, because no changes in travel demand are assumed for these
technical options, even though some of them deliver a gain in fuel efficiency.
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Figure 2. Transport Air Pollution Abatement Supply Curves
in Mexico City: Local vs. Global
efficiency reduces short term marginal costs (Demand change and demand
management will be analyzed in section 4 of this paper). This rather
unimpressive synergy is found also in the case study of Santiago, Chile, for
which the identified measures in the locally motivated program reduces 65
percent of local pollution from these sources but only 5.3 percent of GHGs.
Perhaps more interesting than this comparison in terms of total
quantitative effects is a more detailed look at what each individual measure
on the local control cost curve does to GWP emissions. One perspective is
provided by reranking the 26 control measures according to GWP cost-
effectiveness (Annex Table 1). In Figure 3, we have plotted the resulting
cost-effectiveness ranking according to GWP against the cost-effectiveness
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Figure 3. Ranking of Pollution Control Measures:
Local vs. Global, Mexico City, Mexico
Passenger car U.S. Tier 1 stds
Retrofitting gasoline trucks for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), the most
cost effective measure for controlling local air pollution is also the most cost
effective for climate control, but action number two and three in a locally
motivated program (see Figure 1) have no effect on the climate. In general,
there are two important observations to make from Figure 3. First, there is a
marked lack of correlation in this figure. The technical measures that are
cost effective from the perspective of controlling local air pollution are not
more likely (other than accidentally) to be cost effective from the perspective
of protecting the global environment (there is no tendency of a negative
correlation either). Second, 16 out of the 26 identified control measures in
the locally motivated program have no effect on the global climate. These
are the measures that are all on the upper frame of the figure, coming in last
in terms of cost effectiveness (for additional detail, see Annex Table 1, and
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Figure 4. The Pollution Abatement Curve in Santiago, Chile
Accounting for Global Benefits
fuel efficient or take them towards less carbon intensive fuels  have an effect
on the global environment (unless if they lead to less driving, see below).
In Figure 4, we examine the impact on a locally motivated program for
Santiago when it is credited with ‘collateral’ global benefits. Figure 4 displays
the control cost curve for three control options evaluated in the Chile study:
emission standards for diesel buses (Bus ‘91 stds), standards for diesel trucks
(Truck ‘91 stds), and standards for light-duty gasoline vehicles (LDGV ‘93).
The upper curve includes local benefits and costs only, which was the basis
for evaluation in the original Santiago study. Using the benefit weights of
Table 1, all emission consequences are converted into PM10 equivalents, so
as to arrive at a cost-effectiveness ranking reflecting local benefits. Given
the estimated benefit of $18200 per ton of PM10, all of the three pollution
control measures were attractive even when credited only with local health
effects.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 398
The lower, dotted curve represents the following thought-experiment: If
these three control strategies were credited with a certain value for the
reductions they offer in terms of GHG emissions, how would this modify the
costs? We assume a subsidy received by the policy planner from outside, but
not by transport users, so no demand response is included. The figure shows
that a positive value for greenhouse gases ($20 per ton of carbon and
equivalents in this case) would lower the cost curve. Among these three
measures, the car standards provide the higher amount of collateral GHG
reductions per dollar of control costs. It therefore is the one that displays the
greatest ‘jointness’ between the local and the global agendas. If a subsidy
(or a tax on GHG emissions) for global benefits was applied at a higher rate,
then climate-friendly measures (for example, the LDGV standards measure)
would be more cost-effective and attractive to decision makers. Importantly,
the quantitative impact of these subsidies is limited. If they were to generate
a re-ranking of measures for a locally motivated policy maker, they would
have to be in a radically different magnitude than $20 per ton of carbon.
Furthermore, since the background study only included measures found
attractive within a narrow local perspective, the study’s limitations precluded
that collateral global benefits could make a control measure attractive.
Generally speaking, if there is agreement on a strategy between local and
global objectives in the transport sector, then it is typically because the strategy
either alters total fuel consumption or because it shifts consumption towards
less carbon-intensive fuels. In this case, according to the technical
assumptions, the car standards improve fuel efficiency of gasoline cars (from
7.8 to 9.7 km/liter) as one of its associated effects, resulting in collateral
global benefits. Under the assumption of constant travel distance, this measure
will reduce GHG emissions by 40,000 tons of carbon, which means a saving
of $0.8 million (being credited at $20 per ton of carbon) in total technical
control costs. Notice again the assumption that there is no change in travel
demand. Without complementing measures to control travel demand, this is
a questionable assumption. In the following, we will take a careful look at
the demand change and demand management.ACTING GLOBALLY WHILE THINKING LOCALLY 399
IV. Demand Management: Using Fuel Taxes to Pursue both
Agendas
The observed ineffectiveness of the locally motivated programs in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions raises the question of whether this really
is all the available synergy between local and global objectives. Before we
turn to that question, we should remember that the basic idea behind
environmental taxes is that they can challenge everybody—and polluters
among them—to invent and reveal ways to reduce emissions. Thus, the fact
that locally motivated programs do not include great improvements for the
global environment could simply reflect that those programs are not developed
with the global environment in mind, and thus would only by accident include
global benefits. Measures to deliver local and global emission reductions
have not yet—to our knowledge—received stimuli other than those conceived
in desk studies such as this one. Thus, we can only speculate what control
measures would come out of the woodworks if the policy environment
contained stimuli for both the local and the global public good.
Turning to the practical task at hand, we know that a greater scope for
jointness can be found when one also includes demand management in the
emission control strategy. Proposals for GHG reductions often come in the
form of ‘carbon taxes’, whose principal effects will be to turn users away
from GHG-intensive consumption, and thus to stimulate energy conservation
as well as substitution towards less GHG-intensive energy sources (from
coal to petroleum products, and from petroleum products—and gas—further
towards hydro- and solar energy). Box 1 explains how a simple perspective
from welfare economics allows the development of a cost concept when
demand is manipulated to attain emission reductions. The perspective does
not include the environmental objectives in the welfare function, and thus
represents costs in terms of sacrificed consumption of other,
nonenvironmental goods and services. In Eskeland (1994) it is demonstrated
that this cost concept is also valid when a ‘matching tax’ on polluting goodsJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
5 Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1997), “Is demand for polluting goods manageable? An econometric
model of car ownership and use in Mexico” aimed to see what are the costs to consumers of
giving up gasoline consumption, when price instruments were used to suppress the least
essential trips first. Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1997b) “Rationing can backfire:  The day without
a car program in Mexico City” analyzed a one-day driving ban used to manage demand in
Mexico City.  The ban was found to be counterproductive, leading to increased driving. This
unfortunate outcome was in part because the ban does not have a self-selection property, to
suppress the least essential trips first, in part because the regulation implicitly bundled cars
with driving permits. Mexico City drivers responded in part by purchasing additional used cars
from the rest of the country, thus not only driving more than they otherwise would have, but
also with older, more polluting vehicles, and unnecessarily tying up hardware that could have
been better used by others.
6 The price elasticity for fuel is assumed to be -0.80 for Santiago, Chile, based on a conservative
estimate from the study in Mexico City (Eskeland,1994; Eskeland and Feyzioglu 1997a).
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and services is used in combination with measures such as emission standards,
which stimulate cars and fuels to be cleaner.5
Figure 5, with a locally motivated perspective (locally weighted pollutants,
in PM10 equivalents, along the x-axis), displays the three control strategies
of Santiago as a supply curve. The first, boldfaced curve represents the
reduction in locally weighted emissions provided by the identified technical
controls. Fuel consumption and travel demand are adjusted to reflect changes
in fuel economy and resulting cost reduction per kilometer. This is done by
assuming that the demand function for fuel is derived from demand for travel
and transport. Then, an increase in fuel efficiency that is induced by regulation
will result in an increase in fuel demand corresponding to the reduction in
user cost for the vehicle.6 The second curve displays the additional locally
weighted emission reductions that would be obtained if one levied fuel taxes
to protect the global environment, increased in a stepwise fashion. As shown
in the figure, local emission reductions, then ‘freeriding’ on efforts to protect
the global environment, would then be increased to about 71 percent, up
from the 61 percent local reductions, if carbon taxes were levied at a rate of
$150 per ton of carbon (equivalent to US 10 cents per liter of gasoline, or
about 30 percent ad valorem). The carbon tax rate at $20 per ton ($0.013/ACTING GLOBALLY WHILE THINKING LOCALLY
The top part of the figure is a traditional demand curve for a fuel - for example, gasoline.
Under the assumption that tax revenues are as useful to society as is income to consumers
(and that other taxes are zero), the welfare costs of a tax increase will be equal to the
shaded area, approximated by the rectangle
dw @ t · dx = · ¶x = t · dt · ¶x / ¶p
where  ¶x / ¶p is the slope of the demand curve.
The lower part is just an alternative x-axis, showing how emissions represent a constant
times fuel consumption, as long as the demand changes do not change emission factors
(which for fuel tax changes is a plausible approximation, if not an accurate
representation). Thus, the effect on emissions of a change in the fuel tax rate is the
emission factor times the demand change:
dE = e · dx = e · dt · ¶x / ¶p.
It follows, if we divide the expression for the welfare costs by the expression for the
emission reduction, that the welfare costs of emission reductions, when delivered by
fuel tax changes are:
dw / de = t / e.
Thus, the part of the demand curve over the production cost for fuel appropriately can
be seen as a supply curve for emission reductions (reading it from right to left). The
measure of emissions, E (say, tons per year), and the corresponding emission factor e
(say, grams per liter), can be chosen for the problem at hand.  It could be weighted by
local toxicity if urban air quality is the objective or by global warming potential if the
objective is climate control, so this perspective is applicable in many ways.
Box 1. Emission Reductions with Fuel Tax Changes: Marginal Weñfare Costs
401JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
7 Indeed, matching taxes on fuels are important for local programs dominated by standards.
The Mexico City emission reductions come at a welfare cost 30-45% higher if the fuel tax is
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Figure 5. Local Pollution Abatement Curves: Technical vs. Tax
Santiago, Chile
liter) would expand locally weighted emission reductions from 61 to 63
percent—an important but not stunning contribution to an urban air quality
program.
It is noteworthy that a fuel tax of $20 per ton of carbon is more expensive—
as a means of acquiring local benefits—than any of the proposed locally
motivated measures. Thus, carbon taxes that would matter for the global
environment cannot be justified by saying that they would do something for
the local environment: they would, but not cheaply if one does not value the
global goals. This does not mean that fuel taxes should not play a part in a
local program—indeed here they do—but adding a globally motivated tax
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Figure 6. GHG Reduction in Santiago, Chile
Technical Options and Fuel Taxes
In Figure 6, we have turned the table, to ask: From the perspective of a
body charged with protecting the global environment, what does the pollution
control program in Santiago offer? When viewed from the narrow perspective
of greenhouse gas reductions, we can see that the three technical controls
are costly and offer only tiny emission reductions (only 5 percent of total
emissions from these vehicles at a high cost: at $340 per ton of carbon for
the gasoline vehicle standard, and at $1,550 per ton of carbon for the diesel
bus standard). The illustrative levels of carbon taxes offer greenhouse gas
reductions much more cost-effectively. A 5 percent greenhouse gas reduction
can be achieved by a fuel tax of $20 per ton of carbon. The carbon tax of
$150 per ton can reduce GHG emissions by 29 percent. This figure illustrates
amply how the technical controls of a locally motivated program are not well
geared towards providing global climate protection and how demand
management instruments such as fuel taxes will play a role in GHG reduction.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 404
V. A Globally Motivated Agency in Business with Air Quality
Agencies
As shown above, a carbon tax can be effective in reducing GHG reduction:
Locally motivated urban air quality programs offer no serious competition,
though they do at some point offer a sensible supplement. We also showed,
however, how a carbon tax entails welfare costs locally—deterring but not
killing incentives to levy such taxes.
Let us now introduce an experiment: What if an outside party—a firm,
government or agency who is interested in “buying” greenhouse gas emission
reductions were looking for potential providers. We could foresee such a
demand for GHG reductions coming about through international treaties,
including binding quotas, but also that the international agency would be
authorized to purchase additional reductions from anyone. Similarly, if quota
agreements are tradable, then payments will be provided between a party
purchasing emission reductions from another party, not as a subsidy, but in
return for services rendered.
Of course, it is up to the seller (the city of Santiago, in this hypothetical
case, or perhaps the Chilean government) to determine how and whether it
would offer emission reductions, and it is up to the outside buyer how much
he/she is willing to pay for certain reductions or policy measures. The analysis
here indicates, however, how to calculate the welfare costs to the local party
(population) of delivering GHG emission reductions. We thus have an
indication for the potential buyer of how much will be offered at various
price levels, or what he/she will have to pay. The maximum compensation
necessary would be the resulting welfare loss from the global-oriented policy.
As illustrated in Figure 7, the loss is represented by the area in triangle ABC
(any incremental loss, from additional purchases, is equal to a trapezoid like
the one in Box 1: two such areas together is also a triangle). The average
cost at which the international agency would be buying the emission
reductions, however, would be considerably lower than the marginal costs,
and exactly half the marginal cost if the demand curve is linear.ACTING GLOBALLY WHILE THINKING LOCALLY
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Figure 7. Gasoline taxes and carbon emissions from light-duty
gasoline vehicles
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In Figure 7, a tax at $20 per ton of carbon is assumed to be levied on
gasoline in Santiago, Chile (similar analysis would apply to other fuels).
With a simple log-linear demand function, the potential impact of the tax on
the operation of light-duty gasoline vehicles, especially in terms of travelJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
8 Again, we use the price elasticity for gasoline of -0.8
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distance, fuel consumption, emission reduction, and average cost of GHG
reduction, is assessed.8 The figure indicates that a tax of $20 per ton of carbon
would reduce 34,000 tons of carbon emitted from those vehicles (5.4 percent
if total emissions from these vehicles) at the average cost of $9.3 per ton of
carbon (about half the marginal cost, or the tax rate). The net social welfare
loss (assuming no loss, or gain, from the transfer of tax revenue) is about
$320,000.
Clearly, if the Chileans would do business with the globally motivated
buyer at this price, the carbon tax approach is cost-effective from the
perspective of GHG emission reduction. Local or national governments who
adopt fuel taxes (or other similar restraints) over and beyond possible treaties
and obligations can be compensated for the welfare loss, not as a subsidy
but as a business transaction.
Importantly, if local governments facing such a proposal apply the same
perspective, they would for local reasons apply fuel taxes representing local
benefits of emission reductions, and the carbon taxes levied after the
international business is completed will come on top of those. This represents
no double-counting, as each agency pays for what it gets—not more, not
less.
It should be noted that a framework including payment for emission
reductions—as we have proposed here—rather than payment of emission
taxes to the internationally charged body, involves some difficult issues of
benchmarking, particularly in a long run perspective. The problem basically
is that the internationally charged body should pay other parties only for
measures taken over and above what they would be interested in undertaking
themselves for other reasons—in other words, the incremental cost . Such
problems prevail also in schemes with tradable quotas, for which the
corresponding problem is associated with the initial allocation of quotas. It
is a deep problem, by many found to be the cause of resistance to
transferability of quotas. It does not preclude, however, that trade can takeACTING GLOBALLY WHILE THINKING LOCALLY 407
place on a bilateral basis, but it does require the involved bodies to be
knowledgeable about their business and to be aware of what they are doing.
This basically means that an internationally charged body should be aware
that a polluted urban area has a self-interest in reducing local pollution, and
that urban as well as rural areas should know that they have something to
offer.
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Annex 1
The Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4)
and nitrous oxides (NO2). CO2 is harmless in terms of local pollution but a
predominant source of greenhouse gases (GHGs). The contribution of CH4
and NO2 to global warming is often measured by their global warming
potential (GWP), a ratio of the global warming effect from one kilogram of a
GHG relative to that from one kilogram of CO2 over a specified period of
time. There are professional and learned disagreements about how to measure
GWP (it is a question, in part, of how one discounts the effect on the
greenhouse effect of the gas over time—since this effect differs for different
gases) as well as the environmental costs of global warming. The GWPs
used in the study are 24.5 for CH4 and 320 for NO2. These figures are
suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1996)
for a timeframe of 100 years. Due to lack of GHG emission information in
study cities (this is a general case in most developing countries), we adopt
GHG emission factors in U.S., reported by IPCC (1996). This can be justified
by the facts that most vehicles operating in Mexico and Chile are mainly
manufactured in U.S. and other developed countries and that pollution
emission standards adopted or going to be adopted in these two countries, to
certain degree, are based on U.S. emission standards. In addition, we assume
that the average cost of global warming is US$20 per ton of carbon, i.e., $5.4
per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent.9
9 This number is based on a study by Fankhauser (1995).ACTING GLOBALLY WHILE THINKING LOCALLY
Annex Table 1: Ranking of Pollution Control Measures, Mexico City
              Ranking by
Measure Toxic-wtd. GWP
LPG retrofit for gasoline trucks 1 1
Taxi replacement (Mexican '93 standards) 11 2
U.S. Tier 1 standards for taxi (incr.) 9 3
Passenger car '93 emi. standards (new veh.) 12 4
Re-engine light-diesel buses (U.S.' 91 stds.) 5 5
Re-engine R100 buses (CA'88 standards) 10 6
U.S. Tier 1 stds. for pass. cars (incr.) 22 7
Minibus '92 emissions standards 6 8
Gasoline truck '93 emissions standards 8 9
Gas. truck replacement ('93 standards) 17 10
CNG retrofit for minibuses 2 11
CNG retrofit for gasoline trucks 3 11
Gasoline vapor recovery 4 11
Central I/M for high-use vehicles 7 11
Diesel especial (0.4 percent sulfur) 13 11
Lower Nova RVP (pre-'91 pass. cars) 14 11
Nova Sin (pre-'91 pass. cars only) 15 11
Decentralized I/M for passenger cars 16 11
5 percent MTBE Nova Sin (incr., pre-'91 pass. cars) 18 11
Lower Magna Sin RVP to 7.5 19 11
Road paving (1000 km.) 20 11
0.1 percent sulfur in diesel fuel (incr.) 21 11
Diesel meeting US 1993 specs. (incr.) 23 11
11 percent MTBE Nova Sin (incr., pre-'91 pass. cars) 24 11
5 percent MTBE in Magna Sin 25 11
11 percent MTBE in Magna Sin (incr.) 26 11
Note: The measures ranked at No. 11 by GWP reduction actually have no gain in GWP
reduction.
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